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1 Introduction 
From its inception, the issue of civilian nuclear energy in the United Kingdom has been an 
emotive one.  Born as a project motivated by nationalism in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, Britain became the first country in the world to build a large-scale nuclear power 
station at Calder Hall, Cumbria, in 1956.  Powerful images and rhetoric followed the 
development of the debate, from the early euphoria surrounding the launch of the civilian 
project, to the fear and mistrust characterising understandings of the technology in the 1970s 
and 1980s.    
Interestingly, the language and imagery pervading the discussion of the 1950s has begun to 
permeate current discourses, and (arguably) helped re-establish the high profile of nuclear 
energy on the public agenda once more.  It is again being forwarded by proponents as both 
the key to domestic energy security and a ‘green’ technology1 with the potential to solve the 
environmental concerns of the day (air pollution in the 1950s, climate change today).  
Moreover, media reports (often highly polarised) on the subject have “turned from a trickle to 
a torrent – and suddenly nuclear is big news again” (Leake and Box 2005).  The Sun declares, 
it’s “Time for Blair to Nuke Britain,” while opponents warn “Capitulation to the Nuclear 
Lobby is a Politics of Despair” (Polly Toynbee in The Guardian 2005).   
In light of this apparent renewed media interest in nuclear power – together with a recent 
spate of energy-related consultative exercises initiated by the government – this paper seeks 
to explore the forces underlying the agenda-setting process.  More specifically, the study aims 
to empirically test Baumgartner and Jones’ agenda-setting model (1993) by applying it to the 
case of civilian nuclear power in the UK over the past half-century.  The theory’s central tenet 
is that the interaction between (a) the way a policy is portrayed (policy image), and (b) the 
institutions with jurisdiction over it (policy venue), provides a mechanism for inducing both 
stability and change in the political system.  A critical case study approach is employed to 
verify the model’s theoretical claims, and an empirical investigation is conducted to explore 
whether and how the interplay between actors, interests, institutions and ideas has influenced 
agenda-setting and policy-making processes.   
To outline the structure of the paper, the following section introduces the theoretical 
framework supporting the “punctuated equilibrium model.” Section 3 presents the study’s 
methodological approach, and Section 4 sketches an historical account of the development of 
the nuclear issue.  Analytical results are presented in Section 5, and a ‘post-analysis’ critique 
appears in Section 6, which highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the theory and 
examines the implications of the study’s findings for future agenda-setting research. 
2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Agenda-setting 
The term “agenda-setting” was coined by McCombs and Shaw (1972) in their study of public 
opinion in the run up to the 1968 US Presidential election campaign.  The importance of the 
pre-decision phase, however, had already been highlighted a decade earlier by 
Schattschneider, who claimed "the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of 
power" (1960: 68).  Cobb and Elder’s early studies also stressed the power of the “pre-
political” phase, stating that “pre-decisional processes often play the most critical role in 
determining what issues and alternatives are to be considered by the polity and the probable 
choices that will be made…the critical question becomes, how does an issue or demand 
1 In terms of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. 
CICERO Working Paper 2006:01  
Nuclear Energy: Rise, Fall and Resurrection 
 
 
 
2
become or fail to become the focus of concern and interest within a polity?” (1972: 12).  
Downs’ work on “issue-attention cycles,” attempts to answer this question by suggesting that 
agenda-setting and public policy follow a cyclical pattern that is driven by government 
responses to public concern (1972).  His pluralist perspective was typical of much of the early 
literature on issue-definition and agenda-setting, which Considine (1998: 297) categorises as 
outside-initiative models due to their ‘bottom-up’ approach and emphasis on the role of non-
state actors (McConnell 1966, Downs 1972, Cobb et al. 1976).  In contrast, Considine 
describes Cook et al.’s mobilisation hypothesis (1976) as an inside-initiative model because 
agendas are determined by political elites.  Finally, he classifies the more recent intergrated 
theories as contingency models (Cook 1981, Kingdon 1984, Cook and Skogan 1990, 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Rocheforte and Cobb 1994).  He goes on to explain that the 
prevailing new understanding “appears to reject any precise theory of directionality in agenda 
setting and claims instead that this process occurs as a somewhat unpredictable disturbance to 
an existing equilibrium, precipitated when actors from both inside and outside government 
converge” (Considine 1998: 297-8).  Furthermore, he elaborates, “an ‘interrupted 
equilibrium’ approach appears now to have become the accepted view of agenda-setting, 
perhaps because it is the most elastic of the available generalisations concerning these 
variables and can accommodate the rich diversity of activity typically found in case studies” 
(Ibid.: 298).    
2.2 The punctuated equilibrium model  
It is partly for the reasons outlined by Considine that Baumgartner and Jones’ theory of 
agenda-setting was selected for application in this study.  Not only is it considered to be an 
innovative contribution to the policy studies literature (Plein 1994, John 1998), but its 
synthesis of pluralist, elitist and even social constructivist elements make it well-suited for 
application to an issue such as nuclear energy, where interest group activity, the mobilisation 
of bias and societal perceptions have all played a major role in the policy process.  
Furthermore, the model’s comprehensive and dynamic approach, integrating diverse elements 
such as ideas, institutions, interests, individual agents and socio-economic factors, leads John 
to conclude that it “comes close to an ideal way of analyzing public policy” (1998: 177).  The 
remainder of this section outlines the central features of the punctuated equilibrium model. 
2.2.1 Stability and change 
Baumgartner and Jones’ point of departure is the presence of both stability and change in 
policymaking.  They highlight the limitations of traditional accounts that emphasise stability 
(Lindblom 1959, Wildavsky 1984), as well as more recent approaches stressing social 
learning (Heclo 1974, Hall 1993, Sabatier 1988) and continual change (Kingdon 1984).  
Instead, they “depict a political system that displays considerable stability with regard to the 
manner in which it processes issues, but the stability is punctuated with periods of volatile 
change” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 4).  They support Riker’s claim that “disequilibrium, 
or the potential that the status quo be upset, is the characteristic feature of politics” (1980: 
443).   
2.2.2 Policy subsystems and monopolies 
Like Sabatier (1988, 1991), Baumgartner and Jones point to the importance of policy 
subsystems in policy choice and implementation.  They share with Majone (1989) and 
Sabatier (1988: 129-69) the understanding that ideas and beliefs ‘undergird’ policy positions 
and political structures, and act as the ‘glue’ holding policy subsystems together.  The authors 
are unique, however, in integrating the study of subsystems with agenda-setting models, 
which they accomplish by making pivotal the interaction between institutions and ideas 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 5).  They begin with the assumption that the goal of every 
policy subsystem is to dominate the public agenda by constructing a “hegemonic 
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interpretation of a policy problem or solution” (Howlett 1997: 4).  This is ultimately achieved 
by the creation of a policy monopoly – an institutional arrangement with formal and informal 
rules that is founded on “a powerful supporting idea” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 7).  As 
long as those participating in the policy system continue to share the same values, the policy 
monopoly remains stable.  However, “the generation of new ideas makes many policy 
monopolies unstable in the long-run” (Ibid.: 4).  It is for this reason that Baumgartner and 
Jones reject the existence of a general equilibrium in politics, but do not rule out partial 
equilibria, “enforced through institutional structures such as policy subsystems” (Ibid.: 18).   
2.2.3 Positive and negative feedback 
Another feature central to the dynamism of Baumgartner and Jones’ model is the role of 
negative and positive feedback in politics.  The former is characteristic of conservative 
theories of policymaking, which predict “an initial disturbance becomes smaller as it works 
its way through time” (1993: 6).  It prevails during periods of stability as “privileged groups 
give up a small degree of power when attacked” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 16).  Positive 
feedback, on the other hand, occurs when “small disturbances become amplified, causing 
major disruptions as they operate across time” (1993: 6).  Inspired by Arthur (1988, 1989, 
1990), Kaufman (1976), and Casstevens (1980), Baumgartner and Jones describe how 
bandwagon effects can trigger rapid change as fresh ideas take hold, new proposals and 
participants enter the policy process, and new points of stability are established.  This 
“lurching behaviour of agendas” is reinforced by the “feast or famine” nature of media 
attention (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 20).  As periods of stability tend to follow rapid 
change, “many systems are characterized by long periods of negative feedback and short 
bursts of positive feedback” (1993: 18).   
2.2.4 Interest, apathy and issue definition  
Drawing on the work of Schattschneider (1960), Baumgartner and Jones assume that actors 
with a vested interest will always be more active than those with little at stake (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993: 8).  They argue that the creation and destruction of a policy monopoly “is 
almost always associated with a change in intensities of interest” (Ibid.).  This is typically 
brought about by “a new understanding of the nature of the policies involved” (Ibid.).  Apathy 
is a crucial source of instability because “so long as the possibility exists of mobilizing the 
previously indifferent through the redefinition of issues, no system based on the shared 
interests of the interested is safe” (1993: 19).  There is therefore every incentive for the 
“losers” to enlarge the scope of conflict by transforming the indifferent to interested parties 
(Schattschneider 1960).  They achieve this by redefining old issues to their advantage and 
attaching their policy to strong symbols, such as progress, national identity and economic 
growth (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 11).  This can also have repercussions in terms of 
institutional arrangements.  A wave of enthusiasm for a new policy, which Baumgartner and 
Jones call a “Downsian mobilization,” can lead to the creation of supportive institutions 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 88).  However, when the scope of conflict is expanded in 
reaction against the status quo, it can lead to the dismantling of existing institutional 
structures, termed a “Schattschneider mobilization” (Ibid.: 89).  Issue definition thus drives 
the agenda-setting process and can also induce institutional change as new understandings of 
policy issues enter the public agenda and offer the potential to disrupt partial equilibria. 
2.2.5 Policy image-venue interaction  
To add the final piece to the theoretical jigsaw, Baumgartner and Jones introduce the concepts 
of policy image and venue, claiming that it is the interaction between them that generates 
positive feedback and causes disequilibrium in politics.     
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A policy image is “how a policy is understood and discussed” (1993: 25).  Because public 
policy problems are usually complex, they will often be explained to citizens in “simplified 
and symbolic terms” (Ibid.: 26).  This ties in to Stone’s concept of “problem definition,” 
which she describes as “the active manipulation of images of conditions by competing 
political actors” (1989: 299). The role of policy images is therefore critical to expanding 
issues to the previously apathetic: “Those wishing to mobilize broad groups attempt to focus 
attention on highly emotional symbols or easily understood themes” (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993: 30).  Furthermore, “buttressing policy ideas are generally connected to core political 
values which can be communicated directly and simply through image and rhetoric.  The best 
are such things as progress, participation, patriotism, independence from foreign domination, 
fairness, economic growth – things no one taken seriously in the political system can contest” 
(Ibid.: 7).  As we shall see later, many of these themes have been central to the nuclear energy 
debate 
Institutions and groups with jurisdiction over a given issue are known as policy venues.  
Different venues can be “home to a different image of the same question,” for example, 
environmentalists might associate nuclear power with danger and environmental degradation, 
while industry enthusiasts might link the issue to technological innovation and economic 
progress (Ibid.: 31).  Changes in institutional authority over a particular issue can change over 
time and “may be manipulated by strategic entrepreneurs” as part of the agenda-setting 
process (Ibid.: 5, Riker 1980).  If “losers” can generate controversy over the issue, “the venue 
of decision-making authority is more likely to change,” but if they fail and a consensus is 
established, “policy niches” (such as subgovernments) can emerge, reinforcing stability 
(Baumgartner and Jones: 34).   
In sum, “images and venues are closely associated with each other.  Policymakers attempt 
to both manipulate the dominant understanding of the issues with which they deal and 
influence the institutions that exert jurisdiction over them” (Ibid.: 35).  However, what is 
critically important is that it is the interplay between these processes that drives forward the 
punctuated equilibrium model: “Issue definition and institutional control combine to make 
possible the alternation between stability and rapid change that characterizes political 
systems” (Ibid.: 16). 
 
Relevant actors and 
relationships Anticipated actor behaviour Anticipated policy outcomes 
Policy subsystems (individuals, 
experts, groups, government 
officials and politicians, media) 
Subsystem construction of 
hegemonic policy images.  Struggle 
between subsystem members and 
non-members to alter images, 
change venues and affect 
institutional structures and 
subsystem composition. 
Pattern of construction and 
deconstruction of policy images and 
subsystems results in a stepped or 
“punctuated” equilibrium pattern of 
policy change featuring lengthy 
periods of little or incremental 
change and infrequent periods of 
rapid or major change. 
Figure 1: Key elements of Baumgartner and Jones’ punctuated equilibrium model, 
adapted from Howlett (1997: 8). 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Methodological approach 
Baumgartner and Jones use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in their 
cross-sectional analysis of environmental, agricultural and urban policy in the US.2  This 
study, however, takes a qualitative methodological approach,3 and reduces the scope of the 
investigation to a single issue: UK nuclear energy policy.  A “critical case study” research 
design is chosen due its applicability to studies where “the researcher has a clearly defined 
hypothesis or theory to test and the case study is designed so wider generalizations can be 
drawn” (Burnham et al. 2004: 54).  It thus suits the objectives of this research, which are to 
test the punctuated equilibrium model and explore the broader implications of the findings.  In 
addition, a longitudinal approach is taken to allow the issue to be tracked over time and 
explanations for their rise and fall to be identified.  This follows the recommendations of 
Downs (1972) and Sabatier (1991: 149), who advocate longitudinal analysis in policy 
research, and follows in the example of Baumgartner and Jones, who use the approach in their 
study. 
The central justification for taking a qualitative approach is that the nature of Baumgartner 
and Jones’ theory lends itself well to qualitative methods.  As the authors profess, the model 
is not designed to establish causal relationships between the variables or to make predictions, 
but rather to provide explanatory power and identify patterns of association (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993: 269).  Indeed, it is for this reason that Baumgartner and Jones themselves use 
qualitative analysis extensively in their study.  Any theory that is underpinned by images, 
ideas and values would be difficult to verify using quantitative tools alone, as they are 
notoriously poor at capturing human cognitions and understandings.  This point is echoed by 
Howlett (1997), who applies Baumgartner and Jones’ model to the issues of nuclear energy 
and acid rain in Canada.  Using a purely quantitative approach,4 he finds that the empirical 
evidence does not support the existence of punctuated equilibrium policy dynamics in Canada 
during 1977-1992.  He nevertheless goes on to suggest that “if a punctuated equilibrium 
process is a more qualitative than quantitative construct, its nuances might escape the 
quantitative analysis…set out above.”  Furthermore, he admits, “it is conceivable that 
construction of a database which would capture the qualitative aspects of the punctuated 
equilibrium model might generate better results” (1997: 28).  A qualitative approach is 
therefore taken, combining secondary data analysis and semi-structured interviews.    
3.2 Research methods 
3.2.1 Secondary analysis 
Empirical data was collected from secondary sources, such as academic publications, official 
records, media reports, government policy documents, and websites.  As comparatively little 
had been published academically on nuclear energy policy in the UK since the early 1990s, 
secondary qualitative data was supplemented with the findings from five semi-structured elite 
interviews.   
2 Including nuclear power policy. 
3 Although some public opinion poll data is also used. 
4 Howlett (1997) analysed time-series data based on the frequency of mentions of nuclear energy and 
acid rain on government and public agendas.  His focus was on the level of media and congressional 
attention rather than its tone.   
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3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews have been described as a useful research method for revealing the 
motivations and perceptions of respondents (Flick 2002).  Elite interviews have the added 
benefit of providing “immense amounts of information that could not be gleaned from official 
published documents or contemporary media accounts” (Lilleker 2003: 208).  Five semi-
structured interviews were therefore conducted with leading representatives in the nuclear and 
environmental lobbies to supplement the secondary qualitative data (see Figure 2).  Although 
a larger sample would have been desirable had time and resources been permitting, it was 
hoped that the high profile of the five interviewees would serve to add “textural depth as well 
as empirical strength” to the study (Ibid.).   
 
Interviewee Position Organisation Interview type 
Tony Juniper Director ,  
Vice-Chair (FOE International) 
Friends of the Earth 
(England, Wales & N. Ireland) 
Face-to-face 
Jean McSorley Nuclear Campaign Coordinator Greenpeace UK Telephone 
Adrian Bull Head of Energy Policy Studies British Nuclear Fuels Face-to-face 
Miranda Kirschel Corporate Affairs Manager Nuclear Industry Association Face-to-face (joint) 
Simon James  Communications Manager Nuclear Industry Association Face-to-face (joint) 
Figure 2: Interviewees 
 
The sample was chosen after careful consideration of the organisations and individuals 
involved in the nuclear debate.  Representatives from the “pro-” and “anti-” nuclear 
campaigns were chosen due to their prominent position within their organisations and their 
active role in nuclear power policy and communication.  Tony Juniper is the Director of 
Friends of the Earth (FoE)5 and Vice-Chair of FoE International and therefore holds one of 
the most prominent positions within the UK environmental movement.  Jean McSorley is the 
Nuclear Campaign Coordinator for Greenpeace UK.  Her experience of anti-nuclear 
campaigning spans three decades and three continents.6  Adrian Bull is Head of Energy 
Policy Studies at British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), and has worked for the company in 
technical and policy positions for 22 years.  Miranda Kirschel is Corporate Affairs Manager 
for the Nuclear Industry Association (NIA) – the trade association of the UK nuclear industry 
– and coordinates the All Party Parliamentary Group on Nuclear Energy.  Simon James 
worked briefly for the UK Atomic Energy Authority, but currently holds the position of 
Communications Manager at the NIA.  A joint-interview was held with Kirschel and James 
due to the overlap in their roles at the organisation.  
Interviews were conducted in London between 3rd and 11th August 2005, and ranged in 
length from half an hour to an hour.  Owing to the different backgrounds of the respondents, it 
was judged to be inappropriate and too constraining to standardise interviews.  Instead, a 
more flexible, “semi-structured” approach was taken (Burnham 2004: 206).  An interview 
guide with a (prioritised) list of topics was used to steer the discussion, though the order in 
which the questions were asked, and their precise wording, were not determined in advance 
(Devine 1995: 138).  All interviews were recorded with the permission of interviewees, and 
                                                     
5 England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
6 Jean McSorley founded the local anti-nuclear group, Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive 
Environment, where she worked as the Campaign Secretary for ten years.  More recently, she has 
headed the Greenpeace nuclear campaign in Australia and led the nuclear and energy campaign for 
Greenpeace International in Asia. 
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transcriptions were produced soon afterwards.  Edited transcripts – and later a final draft of 
the paper – were given to interviewees so that they could confirm that their comments and 
opinions had been recorded and understood correctly.    
3.3 Research validity 
A key concern of the study was to safeguard its research validity.  It was for this reason that 
secondary qualitative analysis was supplemented with (albeit limited) primary qualitative 
analysis in the form of elite interviews.  This adheres to the principle of triangulation, which 
“entails using more than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena” 
(Bryman 2004: 275).  Findings from secondary analysis could thus be verified by outputs 
from semi-structured interviews.  It is argued that the study’s methods to a large extent meet 
both quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria for research validity, as summarised in 
Figure 3. 
 
Evaluation criteria Explanation  Meeting evaluation criteria 
Quantitative criteria Source: LeCompte and Goetz (1982) cited in Bryman (2004: 273) 
1. External reliability Can study be replicated? Systematic record of the research process was kept to 
allow a similar procedure to be carried out again 
2. Internal reliability Is there inter-observer 
consistency? 
Author was the only interviewer 
3. Internal validity Do researcher’s observations and 
theoretical ideas developed 
match? 
Secondary analysis was supplemented with elite interviews 
(including follow-up contact) to help the researcher connect 
observations with theory   
4. External validity Can findings be generalised? Broad patterns were identified to enable wider 
generalisations to be made 
Qualitative criteria Source: Lincoln and Guba 1985; Guba and Lincoln 1994, cited in Bryman (2004: 273-6) 
1. Trustworthiness Comprised of four criteria below:  
a. Credibility Did researcher understand 
interpretations of respondents? 
Respondent validation was carried out at the end of the 
project 
b. Transferability Is research transferable? 
c. Dependability Are methods reliable? 
Detailed records of the research process were kept. 
Transparency enables methods to be evaluated and 
repeated 
d. Confirmability Have personal values swayed 
results? 
Researcher strove to be reflexive and aware of personal 
values, but acknowledges findings will be a reconstruction  
2. Authenticity Wider impact of research? To test Baumgartner and Jones’ punctuated equilibrium 
agenda-setting model and suggest areas for improvement 
 
Figure 3: Achieving research reliability and validity 
 
3.4 Ethical considerations 
Burnham et al. present five basic ethical principles that should guide research: avoidance of 
harm, avoidance of deception, right to privacy, right to confidentiality, and consent (2004: 
253).  This study respected these principles by:  
• Informing potential participants about the nature of the research before they were invited 
to participate 
• Making participation voluntary 
• Respecting participants’ right to privacy 
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• Seeking consent before recordings of interviews were made 
• Protecting confidentiality by asking for their consent before their comments were 
published 
• Providing participants with feedback and access to findings 
• Inviting participants to take part in respondent validation exercises where appropriate  
3.5 Key variables 
As already indicated, the study attempts to test whether the variables and mechanisms 
outlined by Baumgartner and Jones prove useful in explaining agenda stability and change in 
the political system.7  The indicators under investigation by this study are introduced in turn 
and form the basis for the analytical framework in Section 5.   
3.5.1 Media coverage 
Baumgartner and Jones believe that the media play an important role in allocating public 
attention to an issue and “reinforcing tendencies already apparent in other areas of the 
policymaking system” (1993: 104).  The authors predict that different elements of an issue 
will be highlighted during periods of high and low attention, and expect shifts in emphasis to 
coincide with changes in “tone” (i.e. negative/positive slant).  For example, if an issue 
associated with economic growth and technological progress is suddenly overshadowed by 
health risks, a surge in attention is likely to follow, and the nature of that attention is likely to 
be predominantly negative.  Baumgartner and Jones employ quantitative indicators to 
measure the level and tone of media attention, which they argue serve as a good gauge of 
agenda status or “the systemic agenda” (Cobb and Elder 1983).  They count press articles and 
code their content according to their positive or negative leanings.8   
The qualitative approach taken by this study seeks to trace the main trends in the volume 
and nature of media reports on nuclear energy over time using secondary source material.  
This is an admittedly subjective exercise that relies on other commentators’ interpretations of 
events, but is nonetheless valuable because it enables defining moments in media coverage to 
be identified.  It also has the advantage of allowing television and radio programmes to be 
taken into account, which is arguably an important consideration given that 79 per cent of UK 
respondents reported television to be one of their main sources of information on “energy 
issues and related technologies” in a European survey in 2002 (Eurobarometer 2002: 60).9     
3.5.2 Venue access 
Baumgartner and Jones trace shifting institutional venues, primarily by measuring the 
intensity of congressional activity in a specific policy area.  They gather quantitative data on 
congressional hearings to establish the level of attention paid to a given issue over time 
(number of hearings), the tone of that attention (enthusiastic or critical), and the venue of the 
attention (which committees and subcommittees held the hearings).  Where data is available 
they also adopt what they describe as an “eclectic approach,” including qualitative 
assessments, in order to examine indicators for: federal executive branch activity, state and 
7 The only variable excluded from the analysis is “nature of the problem,” which Baumgartner and 
Jones primarily reserve for social policy issues. 
8 Baumgartner and Jones focus on articles featured in the Readers’ Guide and New York Times Index 
(see 1993: 50-1), and draw heavily on Weart’s classification methods (1988). 
9 The corresponding figure for the press is 56 per cent (Eurobarometer 2002: 60). 
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local level actions, financial outcomes and public opinion data (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 
52-3).   
This study uses qualitative empirical analysis to explore changes in institutional 
jurisdictions over nuclear energy during the past 50 years.  Venue shifts are tracked so that 
trends and turning points can be identified.   
3.5.3 Policy outputs 
The variable “policy outputs” seeks to capture changes in the “structure of policymaking.”  
Baumgartner and Jones argue that alterations in the policymaking structure (e.g. the 
dismantling of US Atomic Energy Commission) and expenditure patterns can be crucial 
indicators of policy change10.  The approach taken by this paper is to provide an account of 
how UK government policy created the institutions that established a nuclear policy 
monopoly, and then gradually dismantled them in response to changing image-venue 
interactions.      
3.5.4 Changes in institutional structure 
The final variable under examination is the changing institutional and political environment.  
Baumgartner and Jones examine changes in the interest group system, Congressional 
procedures and the relations between federal and state governments.  As they stress the 
importance of the growth in the environmental movement in changing the contexts 
policymaking, this variable is the focus for my study.   
 
4 History of civilian nuclear energy 
This section outlines the development of civilian nuclear power from the post-war period to 
the present day.11  As space does not permit a detailed account of events, the following 
chronology is restricted in focus to presenting the central issues in the debate, introducing the 
main institutions and actors involved, and summarising key policy outputs.    
4.1 Nuclear euphoria: 1945-1975  
4.1.1 The rise of nuclear 
It was America’s refusal to grant the British access to its nuclear technology after the Second 
World War that prompted Prime Minister Clement Attlee to initiate plans to develop the first 
British nuclear bomb in 1945 (Gowing 1964, 1974).  The decision was made without public 
consultation, Parliamentary debate or even full Cabinet discussion (Greenaway et al. 1992: 
121).  The first nuclear power plant was commissioned at Calder Hall in 1953.  The following 
year, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) was established; it was to remain 
“at the heart of nuclear decision making until the early 1970s” (Saward 1992: 79).  Its unique 
status made it powerful: it was financed by government, but escaped “the formal system of 
control” normally imposed on departments of state (Ibid.: 118).  The Authority was given sole 
responsibility for informing government about nuclear energy issues and enjoyed jurisdiction 
over areas such as reactor research and design, management training, procurement of 
10 They also occasionally explore changes in the activities of government officials. 
11 See Williams (1980) and Hall (1986) for more extensive accounts. 
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materials, fuel manufacture and advising the electricity boards – who commissioned the 
reactors (the Central Electricity Generating Board and the South of Scotland Electricity 
Board).  Operational activities were contracted out to four industrial consortia in rotation, 
“despite a pretence of competition” (Saward 1992: 90).   
Although Calder Hall had been enthusiastically presented as the world’s first commercial 
electricity generator, its primary function was to produce plutonium – a vital ingredient of the 
military programme.  As later revealed by Geoffery Lloyd, the then Minister of Power, 
“although the output of electricity would be considerable, it would be more or less a by-
product” (Hall 1986: 43).  The design of the plant therefore centred on its military rather than 
civilian functions, and consequently, little attention was paid to capital and electricity 
generation costs.  As a result, the type of reactor chosen – the British Magnox – was effective 
at producing plutonium rapidly from natural uranium, but was 50 per cent less efficient at 
generating electricity than its coal-fired counterpart (Gowing 1974).   
The Suez crisis of 1956 caused fears to spread about looming fuel gaps and mounting 
foreign energy dependency, which was heightened further still by the unprecedented 
introduction of oil rationing.  And so, in 1957, on the advice of the AEA, the government 
trebled its original 1955 nuclear construction programme from four to twelve plants, 
representing an increase in production capacity from 2,000 to 6,000 MW (megawatts). 
Almost from the outset the AEA had developed an interest in pursuing its own design, and 
used its close proximity to government to ensure that all stations eventually built under the 
first programme followed the Magnox blueprint, despite initial plans to consider a new 
variant after the first eight stations had been finalised (Williams 1980: 18-19).  The 
government did not appear discouraged by technical problems due to over-optimistic 
forecasts by scientists, cost hikes owing to the inexperience of industrial consortia or 
widespread completion delays.  The AEA’s hold over a government heavily reliant on its 
advice was fast becoming apparent: “the Government, by its decision to establish the 
UKAEA, created an in-built nuclear power lobby.  The establishment of institutions 
dependent on nuclear power, meant that energy policy came to be seen as synonymous with 
nuclear power policy” (Greenaway et al. 1992: 123).    
4.1.2 The second programme 
Nevertheless, controversy was beginning to emerge surrounding the issues of reactor design, 
cost and electricity generation efficiency.  The former was to prove the most persistent and 
divisive, with a major dispute beginning in 1955 and spanning the following two decades 
(Greenaway 1992: 124).  While the initial battle was between the AEA’s Magnox and the 
American Light Water Reactor (LWR), by the time preparations began for the second 
programme, the two models had been superseded by the British Advanced Gas-Cooled 
Reactor (AGR) and the US Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR)12 respectively.  Both used 
enriched uranium, but were said to differ in terms of their cost, efficiency and safety.   
In 1964, the Conservatives announced plans for a second programme to build 5,000 MW of 
generating capacity, and the following year, the new Labour Government enthusiastically 
extended the proposed project to 8,000 MW as part of its “technological revolution” (Ibid. 
126).  Choice of reactor design was once again a sensitive issue, with the AEA supporting the 
British candidate, a growing band of dissenters within the Authority backing the American 
PWR, and the Chairman13 of the CEGB preferring a third, Canadian, alternative.  
Nevertheless, the will of the AEA prevailed, and no doubt owing to its “heavy 
12 The PWR is a type of LWR. 
13 Sir Christopher Hinton, who was formerly head of the AEA. 
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involvement…at every stage” the CEGB eventually announced its ‘independent’ decision to 
commission the AGR based “solely on its merits” (Hall 1986: 91).  
 As construction work began, however, further problems emerged.  Costs spiralled to 
twice the original estimate and every plant appeared to demonstrate some technical variation 
because different industrial consortia were given responsibility for building individual 
reactors.  Consequently, construction was delayed, costs escalated, and the capacity target fell 
to 6,000 MW: “The result was severe damage to the morale of the entire British nuclear 
establishment” (Ibid. 92). 
4.1.3 The third programme 
Far from being deterred from nuclear power by the AGR fiasco, the Conservative Party began 
preparing for a third programme soon after re-entering government in 1970.  Once again, the 
options were the AGR and the PWR, but added to the list were the old Magnox and the 
AEA’s newly-developed Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR).  The Vinter 
Committee was set up in 1972 to offer advice on reactor design.  Its members included civil 
servants, the UKAEA and the Chairmen of the electricity boards.  It concluded that the 
competition was “extremely finely balanced,” and made two main recommendations: that a 
more commercial successor to the AGR be developed by the AEA, and that the industrial 
consortia be unified into one organisation (Williams 1980: 201).  The government 
accordingly amalgamated the five existing consortia into the National Nuclear Corporation 
(NNC), which was half owned by the General Electric Company (GEC), and the remainder 
spilt between the AEA and British Nuclear Associates.  It also established the Nuclear Power 
Advisory Board to serve as the Vinter Committee’s more permanent replacement.   
In the meantime, support for the PWR had been snowballing.  The GEC, the CEGB and the 
Chief Scientific Advisor at Department of Energy (Dr. Walter Marshall) all boasted the 
superior export potential and construction simplicity of the American prototype (Greenaway 
et al. 1992: 127).  Parliamentarians, on the other hand, were “hostile to the PWR” and 
expressed dismay over the CEGB’s willingness to defer to American technology (Hall 1986: 
123).   
With the Tories preoccupied by striking miners and an economy paralysed by the oil crisis, 
it wasn’t until Labour came to power in 1974 that the third nuclear programme was finally 
unveiled (Greenaway et al. 1992: 128).  To the surprise of many, the new Secretary of State, 
Eric Varley, announced the government’s modest programme featuring the widely unpopular 
SGHWR reactors.  His decision received a mixed response from the AEA, a lacklustre 
reception from the CEGB, and downright anger from GEC, who reduced it’s ownership of the 
NNC from 50 to 30 per cent in protest (Ibid.).  Ultimately, Varley’s decision had been a 
response to growing public, parliamentary and expert fears concerning the safety of the PWR 
(which had not been approved by the Nuclear Installations Safety Inspectorate) and 
acquiescence to “strong voices within the Labour Movement calling for support of British 
technology” (Hall 1986: 125).  
4.2 Nuclear fear 1975-2003 
4.2.1  Nuclear doubts emerge 
It is claimed that it was not until 1975 that the British nuclear debate began to develop 
some momentum (Williams 1980: 289).  Around this time a flurry of events and reports 
emerged questioning the benefits of the country’s nuclear programme.  It also coincided with 
the establishment of the anti-nuclear and environmental movements in the UK.   
It can be argued that the events surrounding British Nuclear Fuel Limited’s (BNFL) 
application to build a thermal oxide fuel reprocessing plant (THORP) at the Windscale 
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nuclear site proved a crucial turning point in the history of the nuclear energy debate.  BNFL 
had been created in 1971 to take responsibility for fuel procurement and processing from the 
AEA.  In 1975, it submitted an application to the government for permission to extend the site 
so that it could reprocess increased volumes of spent fuel from abroad.14  The following 
October, the Daily Mirror ran the first of two front page articles claiming that the UK was 
becoming the “World’s Nuclear Dustbin” (Williams 1980: 289).  There followed a heated 
public debate on the proposal, and the government eventually bowed to pressure to hold a 
public inquiry.  Although the findings of the subsequent inquiry (HMSO 1978)15, which 
approved BNFL’s application, signalled a defeat for the anti-nuclear movement, it had 
provided the opposition with a vital focal point for its activities and, perhaps more 
importantly still, had supplied its first public platform.  Williams declares it was “easily the 
most important instance of direct contact between the two [pro- and anti-nuclear] sides” 
(1980: 299).  Further weight still was given to the opposition when the well-respected Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution published a report drawing attention to the threat a 
potential plutonium economy posed to civil liberties (1976)16.   
With this backdrop, Tony Benn arrived at the Department of Energy in 1976 and scrapped 
the unpopular SGHWR.  He remained nonetheless committed to the third nuclear programme.  
As far as government and industry was concerned, the main bone of contention remained 
which reactor to build and not whether further reactors ought to be built in the first place.  
And so, against the wishes of the GEC, the AEA, and civil servants – who favoured the PWR 
– Benn announced his intention to build two AGRs (preferred on safety grounds), with a view 
to investigating the merits of the PWR at a later date (which now had qualified approval of 
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate for use in Britain) (Greenaway et al. 1992: 129).  All 
work on the PWR, however, was cancelled by Benn in 1979 following a potentially disastrous 
accident at one of Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island PWR reactors.  The fact that his demand 
was ignored by civil servants, who expected an imminent change of government, was 
testimony to the institutionalised power wielded by nuclear interests at the time. 
4.2.2 The fourth programme 
When Margaret Thatcher led the Conservatives into office in May 1979, the nuclear industry 
finally received a boost at a time of deep crisis.  As Thatcher’s biographer Hugo Young put it, 
nuclear power was “one of the Prime Minister’s particular obsessions” (cited in Greenaway: 
131).  And so, in 1982, the government launched a fourth programme to build ten PWR 
reactors to provide further capacity of 15,000 MW (Greenaway 1992: 130).  Security of 
energy supply was forwarded as the central motivation for the initiative, however, the minutes 
of a Cabinet meeting held shortly after Thatcher’s arrival at Downing Street suggest that there 
might have been other political incentives: “a nuclear programme would have the added 
advantage of removing a substantial portion of electricity production from the dangers of 
disruption by industrial action by coal miners or transport workers”17 (cited in Hall 1986: 
173).   
The first power station was to be built at Sizewell in Suffolk.  In keeping with the promise 
made by the Secretary of State for the Environment18 following the Windscale Inquiry, a full 
public inquiry was to be held into the development plans.  The subsequent Sizewell Inquiry 
14 Including Japan and Italy. 
15 Also known as the Parker Report after Mr. Justice Parker who led the inquiry. 
16 Also known as the Flowers Report, after the nuclear physicist Sir Brian Flowers who led the Royal 
Commission’s inquiry. 
17 Minister for Energy, David Howell 
18 Peter Shore 
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turned out to be the second largest public inquiry to date,19 running from January 1983 to 
March 1985.  While it gave the public an unprecedented right to participate in the decision-
making process (Greenaway et al. 1992: 130), the opposition believed it had been a “meeting 
of closed minds” (Kay 2001).  The CEGB’s construction plans were approved with only 
“minor gestures to the opponents” (Ibid.).  Significantly, however, Sizewell B was to be the 
last nuclear reactor built or ordered in the UK.  Although further reactors had been planned,20 
building work was suspended in the late 1980s in preparation for privatisation of the industry.   
Meanwhile, a major accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Ukraine in 1986 led to 
multiple fatalities and widespread radioactive contamination and raised further fears over the 
safety of nuclear technology. 
4.2.3 Privatisation 
As the centrepiece of the Conservative Party’s 1987 election manifesto, Thatcher’s 
privatisation plans served to politicise the nuclear industry further still.  The 1988 White 
Paper proposed that electricity generation and supply be decentralised and removed from 
public ownership (Department of Energy 1988).  This proved understandably unpopular with 
CEGB, whose centralised control was due to be devolved to regional suppliers owned by 
PowerGen and National Power.  The latter was initially given control of the nuclear plants, 
but after questions were raised over the economic viability of the stations, the government 
eventually removed the nuclear industry from its privatisation plans, and created a public 
company, Nuclear Electric, to run the AGRs and Sizewell B (Greenaway et al. 1992: 132).21   
4.2.4 Nuclear moratorium 
Although Saward may well have described mid- to late 1980s in Britain as “a time of nuclear 
bullishness,” there was scarce evidence to suggest the industry’s fortunes had improved 
(1992: 97).  Privatisation had required greater transparency and led the UK to become “the 
first country in the world to investigate the full cost of nuclear power” (Thatcher 1993: 685).  
A moratorium on new nuclear build was therefore declared pending a five-year review 
(Wakeham cited in Stenzel 2003).  When the Department of Trade and Industry published 
their findings in 1994, it reaffirmed the government’s commitment to privatisation and 
reiterated that the nuclear generating industry should be transferred to the private sector as 
soon as practicable (DTI 1994).  In keeping with this sentiment, British Energy (previously 
Nuclear Electric) was privatised in 1996; it has been struggling financially ever since.22
Following Labour’s second successive General Election victory in 2001, Tony Blair 
announced a major review of UK energy policy.  After considering a total of 400 
submissions,23 the Performance and Innovations Unit (PIU)24 proposed that renewables form 
the cornerstone of future government policy, and necessary measures be taken to keep the 
nuclear option open (PIU 2002: 11-12).  In the post-September 11th 2001 climate, however, 
fears were beginning to grow that nuclear reactors could be a terrorist target.   
19 The largest public inquiry held was into Heathrow’s Terminal 5. 
20 For example, Hinkley Point C in Somerset, Wylfa in Angelsey and Sizewell C in Suffolk. 
21 Though the Magnox stations remained under government control. 
22 Nuclear Energy took over the nuclear power stations owned by Nuclear Electric and Scottish 
Nuclear.  See DTI (2005) for a comprehensive history of the company’s financial record.  
23 For a full list see PIU 2002 (pages 171-9). 
24 The PIU is a sub-department of the Cabinet Office, which now forms part of the Prime Minster’s 
Strategy Unit. 
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In response to the call for a long-term energy strategy, an even broader stakeholder 
consultation was launched in May 2002.  Just over a year, later the Government’s Energy 
White Paper, Our Energy Future – Creating a Low Carbon Economy, was published (DTI 
2003), revealing ambitious medium- and long-term carbon dioxide emissions reduction 
targets for the UK.  It was, however, slightly less positive towards nuclear energy, claiming 
“its current economics make it an unattractive option for new, carbon-free generating capacity 
and there are also important issues of nuclear waste to be resolved” (2003: 12, Para. 1.24).  
While it was not prepared to consider new nuclear build now, it would nevertheless “keep the 
option open” (2003: 44, Para. 4.3). 
Meanwhile, in July 2002, the DTI produced a White Paper, Managing the Nuclear Legacy: 
A Strategy for Action, which announced the intention to establish a new public body, the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), to take responsibility for decommissioning. 
4.3 Nuclear resurrection? 
Although government policy has not changed since the publication of the Energy White Paper 
in 2003, there are growing indications that the nuclear energy debate is in the process of being 
reopened.  A recent surge in media coverage has generated renewed interest in the nuclear 
issue, and evidence points to increased parliamentary activity and a higher frequency of 
industry conferences and events (McSorley 2005).  Some also argue that public opinion is 
moving in a less anti-nuclear direction (Bull 2005, The Economist 2005, Knight 2004).  
Perhaps most importantly, the frame of reference for the debate appears to be shifting, at least 
superficially.  While concerns over nuclear waste, accidents, health risks, economic costs and 
environmental hazards remain in people’s minds, nuclear energy is – for the first time in over 
two decades – increasingly being presented as a potential solution to rather than a cause of 
public problems (Bull 2005).  Political instability in oil-rich nations, (the related) high energy 
prices and energy gap fears have raised concerns over energy supply security.  Rising carbon 
dioxide emissions causing climate change have also lead to calls for greater investment in 
carbon-free technologies.  On both counts, nuclear energy has been portrayed by the industry 
as part of the solution.   
While this paper does not seek to examine the relative merits of nuclear power or to predict 
whether a change in policy might occur at some date in the future, the following section uses 
the theoretical framework outlined in Section 3 to explore the extent to which the interaction 
between policy venues and images can account for the changes in nuclear energy policy over 
the past 50 years.  
5 Analysis 
As outlined in Section 3, four key variables are used to trace the changing image and 
institutional venues underlying the development of nuclear power.  Each variable is analysed 
over the three sub-periods identified in Section 4: (1) 1945 to 1975, (2) 1975 to 2003, and (3) 
2003 onwards.  As will be demonstrated, these phases represented periods when changes in 
media attention, institutional venues, public opinion, policy outputs and the environmental 
interest group system coincided.   
5.1 Media coverage 
The following section demonstrates how the media’s tendency to consider one side of an 
issue at a time reinforces the “lurching behaviour of agendas” and contributes to the creation 
of disturbances in partial equilibria in politics (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 20).  Key trends 
and turning points are identified for each time period.   
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Phase 1: A wave of enthusiasm 
According to Hall, the absence of media scrutiny of the nuclear energy issue in the early post-
war period was glaring: “the way the British press dealt with this vitally important issue was 
woefully inadequate” (1986: 30).  Indeed, when the editorials covered the issue at all, they 
rarely questioned the government’s position, and some went so far as to even defend the 
state’s lack of transparency: “immediate demands of the Government’s attitude towards 
national security justified the creation of these monopoly powers” (Ibid.).25  The problem was 
confounded by the lack of Parliamentary debate and the “wall of silence” imposed by the 
Atomic Energy Act, the Official Secrets Act, and D-notice arrangements (Ibid.).26   
However, coverage of the opening of Calder Hall in 1956 epitomised the wave of euphoria 
that swept across the UK in the height of Phase 1.  Without a doubt, the event inspired awe 
and enthusiasm in the British press, who “extolled the peaceful uses of nuclear power” (Hall 
1986: 32).  The Daily Telegraph declared, “Calder Hall has started a new age,” The 
Economist claimed, “nothing will ever be quite the same again,” and The Times described the 
project in particularly warm terms, as “courageous,” “magic,” and one that “deeply stirs the 
imagination” (Ibid.).  In short, the media reflected the positive image pervading British 
society at the time.  Nuclear energy heralded a new era of hope; of clean, cheap and reliable 
energy; of safe, high-tech jobs; of economic growth and national pride; and importantly, 
signalled an end to air pollution, health problems and the hazardous manual labour associated 
with mining. 
Phase 2: A tide of fear 
By the 1970s, the level of media attention received by nuclear power had increased 
considerably, and the tone of coverage was starting to show a marked deterioration.  Safety 
had been a growing concern ever since the first major nuclear accident had occurred at 
Windscale in 1957, but it wasn’t until 1975 that the integrity of the nuclear image began to 
seriously falter.  If it wasn’t enough that The Guardian and Independent Television reported 
the deaths from cancer of two Windscale employees early that year, the Daily Mirror 
followed up a few months later with two arresting front page headlines drawing attention to 
BNFL’s THORP application.  The first labelled the UK, the “World’s Nuclear Dustbin,” and 
the second read, “Sign here for Japan’s Atom Junk” (Williams 1980: 289).  Considerable 
press exposure followed: The Sunday Times repeated Nature’s calls for caution on the issue of 
British reprocessing, The Economist and The Financial Times voiced concerns that indecision 
could endanger potential Japanese contracts, and The Times called for a public inquiry (Ibid.: 
295).  Indeed, Williams identifies the period between 1975 and 1978 as a turning point in 
media activity, claiming that for the first time there were “innumerable” radio and TV 
debates, plus several major public seminars and hearings (1980: 337-8).  Not only did 
coverage follow key events (such as the publication of the Flowers and Parker Reports)27, but 
the media also published stories intended to generate a wider discussion on the nuclear energy 
issue, which amounted to “an impressive level of sustained media interest” (Williams 1980: 
300).  
When the Windscale Inquiry was eventually called in 1977, it received extensive mass 
media coverage, and even led to the publication of books on the subject by journalists (The 
Guardian 1978, Breach 1978).  The event also firmly established the media as a central forum 
for public debate.  For example, when witnesses were dissatisfied by the way the inquiry had 
25  The Times on the Atomic Energy Act 
26 The D-notice system prevented the press from covering topics that might jeopardize national security 
(Hall 1986: 30). 
27 Reports published by the Royal Commission and Windscale Inquiry respectively (outlined in Section 
4). 
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been conducted, they sent a letter to The Times to publicise concerns that their evidence had 
been “misunderstood, misrepresented, distorted or ignored” (Hall 1986: 162).   
The two-year Sizewell Inquiry28 introduced further negative dimensions to the evolving 
image of nuclear power.  To add to the safety and civil liberties concerns already associated 
with the PWR reactor, “most important of all: the inquiry ensured that the economics of the 
nuclear programme…were in the forefront of public scrutiny” (Hall 1986: 183).  Although the 
cost dimension had always lurked in the background, the Sizewell Inquiry, combined with 
preparations for privatisation of the industry later that decade, brought them decidedly to the 
fore.   
Media coverage in the 1970s and 1980s was dominated by reports of nuclear accidents 
abroad and investigations into the health risks associated with nuclear energy in the UK.  A 
prime example falling into the latter category was the 1983 Yorkshire Television production, 
“Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry.”  The programme revealed that child leukaemia rates 
among Sellafield families were twelve times the national average, which led to media and 
public demands for an investigation (Dalquist 2004: 22).  Furthermore, large-scale accidents 
abroad, such as Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), had a particularly adverse 
impact on media coverage and the images associated with the nuclear debate (Bull 2005, 
McSorley 2005).  The incidents caused media attention to rise overnight and introduced an 
overwhelmingly negative tone to the debate.  Post-Chernobyl reporting, for example, 
typically featured “depressing” and “black” visual images, and the number of risk-related 
articles rose sharply (Boholm 1998, Braxton et al. 1999, Wåhlberg and Sjöberg 2000: 35).  
Conspiracy theories appeared in some media reports claiming that the nuclear authorities 
were “concealing important risk information from potential victims” (Ibid.).  Nuclear 
sympathisers, meanwhile, lamented the deterioration in the quality of the reporting that 
followed the event, “selective and misleading reporting of the dangers of radiation started 
before Chernobyl but then became even worse” (Brenwin 1994).  
A shift had also occurred in the nature of media reporting.  Jean McSorley of Greenpeace 
points out that throughout the 1980s it was predominantly environment correspondents who 
reported on nuclear issues, focusing on decommissioning, waste disposal, the potential for 
accidents and the need for nuclear energy, but in the run-up to privatisation  of the late 1980s 
and beyond, business correspondents began to enter the debate, and introduced greater 
coverage of the financial risks and liabilities and problems with insurance (McSorley 2005). 
Phase 3: The return of nuclear? 
There is widespread agreement that media coverage of nuclear energy has not only increased 
in volume, but also shifted to a markedly more positive tone over the past two to three years 
(Leake and Box 2005, Bull 2005, Juniper 2005, The Economist 2005, Knight 2004).  As 
Adrian Bull of BNFL put it, “since the Energy White Paper in 2003, we really have seen a lot 
of positive press coverage. The kind we could never have dreamt of before” (2005).  He cites 
two front page Independent articles and a half-page feature in The Sun advocating nuclear 
power.  The framing of the issue also appears to be changing, with nuclear increasingly being 
presented in the context of climate change and security of energy supply (Juniper 2005, James 
2005, Kirschel 2005, Bull 2005).  At the same time, Juniper and McSorley are quick to point 
out that the environmental movement has not yet mobilised on the nuclear issue and that 
proliferation, cost, waste and decommissioning concerns remain at the heart of the debate.  
They suggest that claims being made on behalf of nuclear are at present mostly one-sided, 
even in the quality press (McSorley 2005, Juniper 2005).  The apparent “split” in the 
environmental movement over the issue has also been exploited as part of the industry’s high-
budget PR “charm offensive” (Leake and Box 2005).  The industry has succeeded in raising 
the credibility if its case by associating itself with green heavyweights such as Gaia theorist 
28 Spanning January 1983 to March 1985 
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James Lovelock, Greenpeace co-founder Patrick Moore, and long-time FoE board-member 
(the late) Bishop Hugh Montefiore, who have all publicly proclaimed their support for nuclear 
energy.   
 In sum, therefore, policy entrepreneurs – the environmental movement in Phase 2, 
and the nuclear industry in Phases 1 and 3 – appear to emphasise certain aspects of the issue 
in order to maximise their potential support base and dominate the public agenda.  There 
appears to be much truth in Baumgartner and Jones’ assertion that “the set of images of public 
issues put forward in the media is determined by a mix of factual circumstances and by the 
interpretations attached to these circumstances by policy entrepreneurs” (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993: 107).   
5.2 Changing venues 
Alongside the changes in image outlined above, there have been shifts in the institutional 
venues providing the focus for nuclear energy discussions and decision-making.  This section 
follows the movement of the debate from private to public spheres, and changing public 
attitudes towards nuclear power.  
5.2.1 Policy-making venues 
Phase 1: Behind closed doors 
As already described, the decision to develop a British nuclear programme was taken on the 
Prime Minister’s initiative.  When the AEA was established to advise the government on the 
issue, the effect was to ensure it retained a cloak of secrecy for decades to come.  In the early 
years, Parliamentary scrutiny was near impossible.  “The public interest” led to information 
being frequently withheld, costs being hidden and the number of debates in Parliament “could 
be counted on the fingers of one hand” (Hall: 1986: 29).   
Select Committees served as best they could, but faced an uphill struggle to fulfil their 
scrutinising function.  The Estimates Committee conducted the first parliamentary inquiry 
into the work of the AEA when its Industrial Group was investigated in 1958-9.  However, 
following “great pains taken by the Authority to assist the Committee,” it was said to be an 
“affable watchdog” (Williams 1980: 325).  The AEA generally fell outside the jurisdiction of 
the Nationalised Industries Committee, but when the Committee conducted a report on it in 
1962 and identified “serious defects in the existing structure and organization which may 
mean that money is not being spent to the best advantage,” its findings fell on deaf ears (Hall 
1986: 86).  The Public Accounts Committee had somewhat more influence.  It frequently 
investigated the AEA’s finances and “usually offered valuable and searching criticism” 
(Williams 1980: 325).29  Meanwhile the investigations of the Commons Select Committee on 
Science and Technology30 “were of considerable value,” but “far from adequate in getting full 
accountability” (Ibid.).  
To make matters worse, limited scrutiny came from other Parliamentary quarters.  Debates 
in the Commons were “a rarity,” and “statements and answers to Parliamentary Questions 
were as usual under strict ministerial control” (Hall 1986: 74, Williams 1980: 327).  By 
comparison, debates in the Lords were only slightly more frequent than in the Commons, and 
were little more than “interesting” and “informative” (Williams 1980: 327).   
29 For example, Williams describes that until the early 1960s the Committee “found the AEA’s 
accounts to be at best mostly unintelligible, and strongly, and ultimately successfully, urged their 
reform” (Williams 1980: 325). 
30 The Science and Technology Committee was established in 1966 and had already published four 
reports on nuclear energy by the mid-1970s. 
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Phase 2: Into the public domain  
The more open nuclear debate in the media from the mid-1970s caused a corresponding shift 
in the involvement of government institutions.  For example, following the publication of the 
Daily Mirror’s first article in October 1975, Parliamentary Questions on the issue shot up 
from an average of one per month to eleven. As Williams describes, “by 1975 the ‘private’ 
politics of British nuclear had been overtaken by a distinctly ‘public’ politics” (1980: 18).  It 
seemed that policy entrepreneurs had begun to “take advantage of favourable public attention 
and quickly move to ensure a quick assignment by government officials to an encouraging 
institutional venue” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 85).  More specifically, the environmental 
lobby had sought to engage a previously apathetic public in the nuclear debate by drawing the 
issue out into the public arena, where they were more likely to be at an advantage.    
Successfully pressing the government to hold a public inquiry over BNFL’s THORP 
application marked a watershed for public involvement, but at the same time, represented a 
largely symbolic victory.  The inquiry turned out to be less of a participatory process and 
more of a “politically attractive way of accommodating conflict” (Williams 1980: 313).  
Institutional biases clearly remained – the inquiry was set up at speed, making it difficult for 
the fledgling environmental movement to mobilise in time, and the “professional standing” of 
the Inspector’s two assessors was called into question (Hall 1986: 163).  
Evidence of increased activity in the legislature was also beginning to emerge.  Two 
Commons debates were held over BNFL’s THORP construction plans, the first in March 
1978, following the publication of the Parker Report, the second two months later, when the 
Commons approved plans for THORP by a majority of 186 to 56.   
Furthermore, when Thatcher’s plans to build a PWR at Sizewell were announced, the 
public inquiry that had been promised took place.  Despite the dice being loaded once again in 
favour of the government in terms of the expertise and resources at their disposal (Kay 2001), 
“with the Sizewell decision, the Government recognized, almost for the first time, the right of 
public participation in the decision-making process” (Greenaway 1992: 130). 
Opposition from Select Committees, however, remained weak.  The Select Committee on 
Energy “under its various titles has been the one forum of public debate that nuclear power 
has consistently received,” however even its findings were frequently dismissed (Ibid.).  In 
sum, “although the select committees of the House of Commons have provided one of the few 
public forums for discussing nuclear power policy, they have only limited effect on the course 
of that policy” (Ibid.: 138). 
The energy policy review, commissioned by Tony Blair in 2001, signalled another 
important shift towards public venues and participatory processes in decision-making.  For 
the first time, responsibility for investigating the long-term and strategic issues surrounding 
the policy had been taken out of the hands of the department with jurisdiction over it (the 
DTI).  Instead, the task was given to the relatively newly established Performance and 
Innovations Unit (PIU), a small department within the Cabinet Office reporting directly to the 
Prime Minister through the Cabinet Secretary.  With approximately half its staff drawn from 
outside Whitehall (PIU 2002: 168),31 it could be argued that the policy venue had finally 
shifted outside the nuclear “policy subgovernment.”  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
Ministerial Sponsor was Brian Wilson, the Minster for Industry and Energy at the DTI.   
In addition, a second consultation process was launched the same year by the Department 
for the Environment, Food and Regional Affairs (Defra), to explore proposals for developing 
a policy for managing solid radioactive waste.   
31 Members of PIU have backgrounds in private sector consultancies, think tanks, NGOs, academia and 
local government (PIU 2002: 168). 
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A further significant indication that policy processes were taking on a more participatory 
style emerged when the DTI launched a major stakeholder consultation in 2002 in preparation 
for the publication of the 2003 Energy White Paper.  Having received 6,500 contributions 
from stakeholders and the public between May and Sept 2002, it represented “the most 
significant consultation on energy policy ever undertaken in the UK” (DTI 2005).   
Phase 3: Back behind closed doors? 
Since 2003, evidence suggests that policy entrepreneurs in the nuclear industry, together with 
civil servants at the DTI, have not only been mounting a concerted media offensive, but 
perhaps more importantly, are in the process of lobbying opinion leaders and politicians 
behind closed doors (Leake and Box 2005, McSorley 2005, Juniper 2005).  Numerous 
meetings are reported to have taken place between industry representatives and analysts, 
corporate traders, the media and politicians (Leake and Box 2005).  For example, in March, 
the Energy Industries Club gathered “top opinion formers” and “more than a hundred leading 
figures from the UK’s energy industry” to hear Mike Alexander, (then) Chief Executive of 
British Energy, present his case for nuclear power as the “fuel of the future” (Ibid).  At a 
second exclusive event, this time hosted by the leading British engineering firm, AMEC, 
“some of Britain’s most senior business journalists” were assembled to listen to Sir David 
King (the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor), Brian Wilson (the former Energy Minister) 
and Dipesh Shah (Chief Executive of the UKAEA) espousing nuclear power’s merits as a 
solution to climate change and a means of securing energy supply.  In both instances, 
“invitations were based on so-called Chatham House rules, meaning it was for ‘background 
use only.’ What they were meant to take home was a message: nuclear power is coming back” 
(Ibid.).  
 Civil servants at the DTI have also been active behind the scenes in promoting a 
revival of nuclear energy, which the Department believes would provide a powerful economic 
boost to engineering companies and scientific research units.  Evidence of pro-nuclear 
briefings by senior officials include Adrian Gault’s (Director of the DTI Energy Strategy 
Group) presentation to the International Energy Conference in June 2004,32 and Joan 
MacNaughton’s (Director General of the DTI’s Energy Group) leaked confidential paper to 
the newly appointed Alan Johnson (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) in May 2005 
(Ibid.; Watts and Murray-Watson 2005).   
Finally, scientific communities are also rallying around the nuclear cause, with the Royal 
Society, the Royal Academy of Engineers and the Institution of Civil Engineers “discreetly 
lobbying the government to look again at nuclear power” (Leake and Box 2005). 
Whether these developments represent the beginnings of a venue shift away from the public 
arena and into private spheres remains to be seen.   
5.2.2 Public opinion 
From the outset, public understanding of the nuclear issue has been confused.  As an 
archetypal technical issue, “those with an interest in restricting the debate” have benefited 
from explaining issues in “arcane and complicated ways” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 30).  
Robert Knight of MORI suggests, “familiarity with [energy] issues is low and, as in any area 
where scientific opinion is pivotal, public opinion is vulnerable to the introduction of new 
fears that they are unable to fully evaluate” (2004: 26).  This gives the media an important 
role in influencing perceptions of risk, especially when the public have less experience or 
knowledge of the hazards (Williamson and Wayman 2005). 
Phase 1: Acquiescence 
32 Also see Jameson (2005) 
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During the first two decades of the post-war period, development of nuclear energy was 
presented as not only desirable, but necessary (Williams 1980: 17).  It has been claimed that 
the key reason underlying the lack of politicisation of the issue in Britain was “the prevailing 
socio-political culture, which, broadly has encouraged trust in public authorities, and also 
consensus” (Ibid.: 264).  The result was an absence of “significant dissent” throughout the 
1950s and 1960s (Ibid.: 17).  Furthermore, the issue was consistently presented as a technical 
matter “beyond the people and the politicians,” as aptly exemplified by the AEA’s Chairman: 
“The public doesn’t and cannot be expected to understand the issues of nuclear power in other 
than the broadest terms” (John Hill cited in Greenaway 1992: 138).  As such, the nuclear 
debate was much slower to capture the attention of the British public than it had been in the 
US, despite the fact that the first nuclear accident had occurred on British soil (Dalquist 2004: 
20).   
Phase 2: Emerging uncertainty  
The 1974 mobilisation against the AGR led by FoE signalled the beginning of a new era of 
public engagement.  The “mystique” of nuclear’s scientific and defence background was 
beginning to arouse public suspicion, and the lack of transparency in policymaking caused 
considerable frustration (Williams 1980: 271).  This sentiment was expressed clearly in a 
memorandum submitted by two leading FoE campaigners to the Science and Technology 
Select Committee at the time: “Democracy is dead when the people are told that they cannot 
understand or participate in the gravest public decisions” (Lovins and Patterson cited in 
Williams 1980: 262).  With  the THORP controversy and Windscale Inquiry following in 
close succession, “by the mid-seventies it was apparent to every reasonably informed member 
of the British public that nuclear had become highly controversial” (Williams 1980: 17).   
The growth of the environmental movement, media interest and Parliamentary activity led 
to increased access to information and greater public participation.  In 1976 alone, 600 letters 
and 12 petitions arrived at the Department of Energy, a rally in Trafalgar Square was held 
against the THORP project, and a petition to stop the development received 27,000 
signatures33 (Ibid.: 291, 295).   
As Figure 4 demonstrates, the public had gone from a position where twice the proportion 
had been in favour of nuclear build in 1978, to one where opinion was evenly split between 
proponents, opponents, and the undecided, by 1980.  Further, in 1981, opponents briefly 
outnumbered those in favour, which was likely the cumulative effect of the aftermath of the 
Windscale Inquiry, the Three Mile Island accident (1979) and Thatcher’s decision to build the 
controversial PWR reactors (Dalquist 2004: 20).  The transformation in public opinion was 
also in part owing to the anti-nuclear movement’s success at keeping the debate alive by 
exposing industry activities such as deep-sea waste disposal and effluent build-up in the Irish 
Sea, and galvanising local opposition (Ibid.: 181-2).   
Fears over nuclear were also fuelled by media outputs, such as Yorkshire Television’s 
Windscale: The Nuclear Laundry, but more importantly still, by Chernobyl, which delivered a 
hard blow to public confidence in the technology.  Nevertheless, Dalquist argues that 
compared to other nuclear nations, the British public were comparatively accepting of the 
industry during the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when public opinion in countries such as 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands had “hastened legislative decisions to formally phase-
out nuclear power” (2004: 25).  She attributes this to three key characteristics specific to the 
British case: prompt and skilful public relations exercises by the nuclear industry following 
nuclear accidents and health-risk scares; positive public perceptions of the trustworthiness of 
nuclear agencies; and a belief that nuclear power safeguarded UK energy independence (Ibid.: 
22-3).   
33 In comparison, the petition in favour of THORP received only 18,000 signatures. 
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Figure 4: Public support for the construction of new nuclear plants 1978-82             
Source: Dalquist 2004 
 
Phase 3: Warming to nuclear? 
The availability of opinion poll data over the past five years or so is in itself confirmation that 
greater attention is being paid to the public image of nuclear, with polls largely being 
commissioned by the industry itself.  How the findings of the polls are interpreted, however, 
varies greatly according to who you ask.  Adrian Bull at BNFL says, “We’ve got public 
opinion polling data showing that the public are much more – I wouldn’t necessarily say 
supportive – but much more accepting of nuclear now than they have been in the past, 
particularly over the past five or so years” (2005).  He attributes some of the change in the 
tone of coverage and public attitudes to the high profile of climate change within Blair’s 
international agenda, highlighted by Britain’s Presidencies of the G8 and EU: “there have 
been an awful lot of positive media stories about the climate change debate in general, 
virtually all of which have hooked at some point into looking at nuclear and at least have 
outlined that it is a carbon-free technology, albeit they might have listed some other issues as 
well.  I just think that puts it into public consciousness a lot more” (Ibid.).  McSorley of 
Greenpeace, however, denies that the public image of nuclear has changed in the mind of the 
public: “We have been tracking opinion polls very closely.  Apart from the MORI poll for the 
NIA in December 2004, every one shows people against nuclear and/or new build” (2005).  
Juniper of FoE, however, concedes that the industry has “had a relatively good public 
relations pitch, in the last three years in particular” (2005).  
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate that there does appear to have been some movement in public 
opinion since the industry’s PR campaign began in 2003, however public opinion remains 
divided, and a high proportion are undecided (Dalquist 2004, Knight 2003).  Nevertheless, by 
the close of 2004, more people were reporting favourable than unfavourable attitudes towards 
nuclear energy and new build for the first time since continuous tracking of these questions 
began in the late 1990s.  Negative associations mentioned by the public included risk of 
accidents, long-term disposal of waste, radiation and pollution; positive images included clean 
air, reliability of supply, and contribution to helping global warming (Knight 2003: 47).   
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Figure 5: Public attitudes towards the nuclear industry/energy 1998-200434
Source: MORI 
 
Figure 6: Support for new nuclear build to replace existing stations, Jul ‘01-Dec 
’04.35 Source: MORI 
Interestingly, it seems that context and framing of the nuclear issue, especially through the 
media, seems to remain a key determinant of public opinion.  To illustrate this point, 
following the transmission of the BBC2 programme, If...the Lights Go Out, depicting life in 
Britain following a power cut, almost 76 per cent of BBC interactive users said they believed 
Britain should keep nuclear power option open.  While the self-selecting sample of almost 
9,000 respondents was unlikely to have been representative of the British public, it is 
significant to note that after watching a programme heavily featuring NIA representatives 
making the case for nuclear as a reliable energy source – behind the backdrop of power-cuts 
becoming a reality – the public’s response should be so overwhelmingly pro-nuclear, which 
was out of kilter with the thrust of public opinion at the time.    
                                                     
34 Based on the question, How favourable or unfavourable are your overall opinions or impressions of 
nuclear energy/nuclear industry?  Approximately 2,000 respondents 
35 Based on the question, To what extent would you support or oppose the building of new nuclear 
power stations in Britain TO REPLACE those being phased out over the next few years?  This would 
ensure the same proportion of nuclear energy is retained.  Approximately 2,000 respondents. 
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5.3 Policy outputs 
As proposed by Baumgartner and Jones, the rise and fall of the nuclear industry in the UK can 
to some degree be attributed to changes in policy outputs.  The following account examines 
how government policy has restructured the institutions involved in nuclear policy-making, 
and led to the “construction and collapse of a policy monopoly” (1993: 59-82). 
Phase 1: Construction of a policy monopoly  
There is little doubt that when the government established the AEA to develop its nuclear 
programme in 1954, it created “an in-built nuclear power lobby” (Greenaway et al. 1992: 
123).  As the sole advisor to the government, the AEA’s 17,000 staff fuelled “the first 
powerhouse of ideas,” and “enjoyed wide outside support, amongst the public and media and 
within Westminster and Whitehall” (Williams 1980: 328).  As was the case in the US, “the 
initial institutional arrangement of civilian nuclear power questions could not have been more 
favourable to the development of the industry.  Institutions were purposefully designed to 
ensure control by those most strongly interested in advancing the technology” (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993: 66).  The AEA and CEGB’s respective monopoly positions and proximity to 
decision-making processes led both institutions to regard themselves “part of government” 
(Williams 1980: 329).  Furthermore, the unwillingness of government to question the 
decisions of the experts (Massey 1988: 66) led to “a decision-making legacy of ‘secrecy and 
remoteness,’” where “even the Cabinet knew little” (Wynne 1982: 22-3, Saward 1992: 83).  
Politicians and civil servants lacked the scientific background to query the advice they 
received, and attempts by the Royal Commission to fill this gap were an “imperfect” 
substitute for an independent watchdog able to provide a thorough techno-economic 
evaluation of nuclear proposals (Williams 1980: 329).  By 1961, the AEA staff had already 
more than doubled to 41,000 (Williams 1980: 328), and “within a decade and a half following 
its creation, the AEA and its scientists were the dominant force within a closed policy 
network” (Saward 1992: 83).   
Nuclear policy entrepreneurs had therefore successfully presided over the creation of a 
policy monopoly, founded on the underlying premise that nuclear power was essential for 
national economic and strategic purposes.  They had also succeeded in gaining political and 
financial support to construct nine Magnox power stations as part of the first programme, and 
five AGR plants as part of the second.  As predicted by Baumgartner and Jones, the resulting 
“institutional legacy of agenda access” served to “structure participation so that a powerful 
subsystem remained relatively independent of popular control” for at least two decades to 
come (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 83). 
Phase 2: Collapse of a policy monopoly 
During the 1970s, however, forces conspired to produce policy outputs that weakened the 
structure of the nuclear policy monopoly.  Several of the AEA’s tasks were removed from its 
jurisdiction and new commercial pressures were introduced to the industry: the Radiological 
Protection Division became the  National Radiological Protection Board; the Production 
Group’s fuel procurement and processing activities were devolved to BNFL; Radiochemical 
facilities became The Radiochemical Centre Limited; the Atomic Weapons Research 
Establishment was moved to the Department of Defence; and the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate joined the new Health and Safety Executive (Saward 1992: 94, Williams 1980: 
329).  As the wall of secrecy surrounding the industry began to fall, control over the agenda 
also deteriorated.  Questions of safety, cost and civil liberties were no longer out of bounds, 
and public inquiries generated considerable dissent and opposition (O’Riordan et al. 1988).  
By the mid-1980s, the need for nuclear power had to be defended from attack by a growing 
anti-nuclear movement, a sceptical media and a wary public.  By the time of the Hinkley 
Point Inquiry, energy source diversity had become nuclear energy’s new rationale when 
strategic and cost arguments no longer cut ice.      
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The process of privatisation also led to further dismantling of the nuclear policy monopoly.  
As detailed in Section 4, the CEGB was divided, decentralised and privatised.  The once-
powerful AEA, meanwhile became “a shadow of its former self” and adopted a narrow 
research role (Saward 1992: 98). 
Saward describes how “the industry, for a time at least, weathered the storm by processes 
of adaptation and retreat” (Ibid.: 97).  This fits in with Baumgartner and Jones’ concept of 
negative feedback, which characterises periods of stability in the policy-making process.  
Policy change occurs incrementally due to the dominant (but declining) policy subsystem 
defending its institutional legacy by moderating its strategy to minimise power losses.  
Examples of “adaptation and retreat” actions include, first, the strengthened role of the British 
Nuclear Forum as a pro-nuclear representative and information centre in 1976 when the 
debate reached the public domain and negative images began to emerge (Williams 1980: 
270).  Second, the response of the CEGB to criticism at the Sizewell Inquiry allowed them to 
“respond to weaknesses in their case exposed at the hearings” so that their case for the PWR 
was ultimately strengthened (Kemp 1986: 343).  Third, public inquiries themselves “can serve 
as co-optive mechanisms” whereby opposing groups “enter the nuclear network; but they 
remain severely out-resourced, and their formal role is often token” (Saward 1992: 98).  This 
appears to have been true of the anti-nuclear movement in its early days.  
The final, but perhaps most important point to make is that while the nuclear policy 
monopoly was considerably undermined over this period, “nuclear power has remained a 
protected species” (Greenaway et al. 1992: 133).  Policy outputs, in terms of the number of 
new plants commissioned, may not appear to have been particularly favourable, with so few 
plants actually constructed under the third and fourth nuclear programmes.  However, it is 
worth noting that despite the lack of expenditure on nuclear new build, a significant 
proportion of the nuclear institutional legacy remains intact and retains its privileged status – 
protected, close to government and subsidised by the taxpayer.  To illustrate this point, first of 
all, BNFL and the AEA are still owned by the DTI.  The former runs an Energy Studies Unit, 
which maintains links to government and “provides advice and information to government, 
when requested, on nuclear and energy policy issues” (Bull 2005).   Secondly, the two bodies 
responsible for waste management, the NDA and Nirex, are also publicly owned and funded.  
The former was launched in April 2005 to take on ownership and responsibility for the 
decommissioning of public sector nuclear sites (NDA 2005),36 the latter is responsible for the 
long-term management of radioactive waste, and was made independent of the industry in 
April 2005.37  Third, although British Energy was privatised in 1996, its survival has 
depended on the government’s willingness to provide it with a credit facility and underwrite 
its liabilities. 
Phase 3: Return of the nuclear lobby? 
While the remaining structure of the nuclear industry pales in comparison to its previous 
prominent stature, policy outputs have nonetheless left it in a comfortable position in terms of 
insider contacts and access to public resources.  This legacy has also left the industry well-
placed to try to influence future policy outcomes.   
The most important outputs to emerge in Phase 3 have been the publication of the Energy 
White Paper, stating the government’s intention to keep the nuclear option open, and the 
establishment of the NDA.  However, indications from the Minister for Energy, Malcolm 
Wicks that a decision will be made on the future of the nuclear industry during the course of 
this Parliament (McSorley 2005, Juniper 2005) have also served to further fuel the activity 
already generated by the nuclear lobby in the run-up to the General Election in anticipation of 
36 The NDA was established under the 2004 Energy Act  
37 However, it is funded by the NDA 
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an imminent decision on the subject (Leake and Box 2005).  Media reports have suggested 
that “many months ago…some of the biggest firms in the nuclear business began a round of 
recruitment, taking on high-powered new media directors, political advisors and public affairs 
companies” (Ibid.).  These firms apparently included none other than the publicly-funded 
NDA and Nirex, plus the financially struggling British Energy, whose PR campaign 
reportedly cost in excess of £1m (Ibid.).  In addition, the NIA – which retains strong links 
with public bodies such as BNFL38 – was re-branded in 2003; its website now runs under the 
banner heading “Nuclear: Climate Friendly Energy.”39  The same year, the Association co-
founded the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Nuclear Energy, “to encourage and facilitate 
discussion among MPs and Peers from across the political spectrum with an interest in 
nuclear issues, and to provide a forum for the exchange of information and views between 
Parliamentarians and representatives of the nuclear and energy industries.”40  Given that the 
NIA have also secured responsibility for the administration of the Group,41 the joint initiative 
arguably serves to re-institutionalise the links between industry and politicians. 
In sum, there seems little doubt that the nuclear lobby is regrouping in an effort to launch 
itself as a ‘green’ alternative and a reliable energy source of the future.  As Bull explains, “in 
terms of hooks to get people engaged…There are two strands of message which the industry 
has got.  One is the environmental long-term message – we need to do this for the sake of 
future generations…and the other is a very short-term your-lights-could-go-out-this-winter 
message” (2005).   
To apply Baumgartner and Jones’ model to recent developments, therefore, it would appear 
that policy entrepreneurs within the nuclear industry are in the process of attempting a 
Schattscheider mobilisation – a move to redefine the terms in which the nuclear issue is being 
discussed in order to broaden its appeal to the public and politicians. 
5.4 Changing institutional structures 
Phase 1: A change in values 
The anti-nuclear and environmental movements in the UK were slow to emerge in 
comparison with equivalent organisations in Europe and the US.  Their growth was widely 
associated with a change in social values following a wave of post-war prosperity:  
“At the end of a period of rapidly increasing economic wealth, a 
generation who had, quite literally, never had it so good, found 
themselves affluent enough to challenge the desirability of 
unrestrained growth.  They questioned the values of industrial society 
and the materialism that went with it” (Hall 1986: 137).   
FoE, which was founded in 1970, was one of the first environmental groups to be 
established and “more than any other organisation was responsible for getting the bandwagon 
rolling” (Ibid. 138).  The group’s first campaign was a reaction to the CEGB’s enthusiasm for 
the American LWR, which they believed to be unsafe.  Two of their most influential members 
– Walt Patterson and Amory Lovins – wrote a paper for the Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, which was to have an encouraging impact: “The success and importance of this 
memorandum was that it managed to break into a realm that hitherto had been the prerogative 
38 Bull 2005 
39 http://www.niauk.org/
40 http://www.allparty-nuclear.org.uk/
41 “The administration of the Group is undertaken by Miranda Kirschel of NIA, organising the Group’s 
programme of events, arranging speakers, venues, and appropriate visits for the Group” (Ibid.).  
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of the scientist and politician…for the first time, the anti-nuclear movement had established 
itself as an effective critic.” (Hall 1986: 141) 
Phase 2: The rise of the anti-nuclear movement 
By 1976, FoE had amassed 8,000 members in 160 local branches (Williams 1980: 262).  
Early opposition to nuclear policy was fielded at the local level.  As the government ran out 
of suitable publicly owned land on which to site nuclear reactors, environmental groups 
rallied local support and participated at planning permission hearings and local inquiries.  
Both FoE and the Conservation Society had been present at the Torness inquiry in Scotland, 
and when the development project was approved against the will of the public, they initiated 
the first direct action campaign at a nuclear plant – a hundred people camped for a weekend at 
the proposed site.  The significance of the growth of the movement was that it demonstrated 
its opposition in a way unlike anything experienced in the UK before; rather than tacit 
“gentlemanly” lobbying, it promoted participation through demonstrations, local activism and 
the use of public relations and the media (Hall 1986: 138). 
The movement continued to contest nuclear construction projects, but finally entered the 
national debate when it mobilised in response to the Windscale proposal.42  When the inquiry 
was held, many environmental groups managed to secure legal representation, some in their 
own right, such as Friends of the Earth, others as part of an umbrella organization43.  And 
when the inquiry failed to get the desired result, the movement contested not only the result, 
but more importantly, the validity of the inquiry process.  While they had failed to influence 
nuclear policy, “FoE in particular demonstrated…it was possible for a group to have a 
significant impact on public policy despite lacking privileged access to the inner circle of 
British decision-making” (Williams 1980: 319). 
In terms of Baumgartner and Jones’ model, the anti-nuclear and environmental movement 
represented strategic actors undertaking a Schattschneider mobilisation against the status quo, 
namely, the nuclear industry’s policy monopoly.  They encouraged issue expansion by 
bringing new dimensions of the issue to the debate: “the agenda was enlarged largely through 
the efforts of anti-nuclear groups, to include, for example, public debate about the risks of 
radiation from nuclear installations and the desirability of the growth ethic underlying 
arguments for nuclear expansion” (Saward 1992: 95).  In addition, cost calculations and the 
need for reprocessing were brought under question, safety issues were raised following the 
discovery of leaks and evidence of local contamination of the River Calder (Hall 1986: 149), 
and civil rights implications were brought to the fore by the publication in 1976 of Nuclear 
Prospects: A Comment on the Individual, the State and Nuclear Power (Williams 1980: 268). 
44   
To strengthen the movement further, Greenpeace UK was born in 1977.  Its focus on 
visually-powerful, and often dangerous, publicity stunts contributed to the strong negative 
images associated with the nuclear industry.  One of its first actions was to film footage of a 
British ship dumping radioactive waste, which attracted international television news 
coverage (Greenpeace 2005).  A second striking example was when four Greenpeace divers 
were contaminated by a radiation leak while attempting to block a discharge pipe at Sellafield 
nuclear reprocessing plant in 1983.45   
42 Among the environmental groups involved were FoE, Half Life, the Socialist Environment and 
Resources Association and the National Association for Freedom. 
43 Led by the Conservation Society. 
44 Published by FoE, the National Council for Civil Liberties and the Council for the Protection of 
Rural England. 
45 “BNFL was later found guilty, on four criminal charges, for the discharge” (Greenpeace 2005). 
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Participation in the early public inquiries produced a series of disappointing results for the 
environmental movement, a notable example being the Sizewell Inquiry, where “the gap 
between the two sides in knowledge and expertise was glaring” (Kay 2001).  By the 1990s, 
however, environmental groups were better resourced and more experienced.  The result was 
that they began commissioning research of their own, and tried to steer the debate in their 
favour by publishing their own policy proposals.  Juniper cites the success of FoE to block 
planning permission for Nirex to build an underground laboratory to investigate the suitability 
of a deep disposal site at Sellafield in 1997 as a crucial psychological turning point in the 
nuclear debate (2005).  He claims, “It was FoE that won that campaign – I think I can safely 
say that – it was our involvement in the public inquiry.  On a very technical level we stopped 
them getting permission for this deep disposal site, and this was on very good geological 
grounds.  At that point the momentum inside the British nuclear industry was fatally 
weakened and it went down to nothing.”   
Phase 3: A mature environmental movement 
Since 1997, Juniper explains that FoE have pulled back their nuclear campaign and shifted the 
focus to climate change, energy efficiency and renewables.  Although “nuclear is very much 
on the radar screen,” it will not be until the debate enters a political phase that they plan to 
mobilise.  Signs from the Treasury, Defra and Foreign Office indicate that nuclear is unlikely 
to get a warm reception from their quarters, on the grounds of cost, environmental and 
proliferation/security concerns respectively (Juniper 2005).  This change in strategy has even 
led to a restructuring of the organisation, with the nuclear energy department now subsumed 
within the larger climate change unit. 
5.5 Issue-venue interactions 
In sum, Baumgartner and Jones’ model proves useful in assisting the interpretation of the 
events leading to the construction and collapse of the nuclear policy monopoly in the UK, as 
illustrated by Figure 7.     
In Phase 1, nuclear power had predominantly positive connotations.  It was largely popular 
among the media, public, experts and politicians.  Decisions were taken “in private” by the 
executive, with limited Parliamentary or media scrutiny.  A Downsian mobilisation by 
nuclear proponents was successful in disrupting the status quo and establishing a supportive 
institutional framework.  A process of positive feedback led to the creation of a powerful 
policy monopoly, which disrupted the partial equilibrium of the policy subsystem.  
Subsequent policy outputs served to reinforce the monopoly. 
  In Phase 2, forces conspired to dismantle the key institutions upholding the dominance of 
the nuclear policy subsystem.  New actors entered the debate, such as the public, media and 
legislature.  Policy entrepreneurs – the anti-nuclear/environmental movement – undertook a 
Schattschneider mobilisation, attempting to redefine the issue, engage the apathetic and 
expand their support base.  Negative images were emphasised, and support for nuclear 
declined.  The executive was forced to demystify the decision-making process and accept 
greater media and legislative scrutiny.  A process of negative feedback led the policy 
subsystem to adapt and retreat.  Policy outputs grew unfavourable to the policy monopoly and 
led to its decline. 
At present, it is unclear whether Phase 3 represents the prelude to a second Schattschneider 
mobilisation or the end of Phase 2.  While there is no conclusive evidence pointing in either 
direction, there is reason to believe that policy entrepreneurs within the nuclear industry are at 
least attempting to resurrect nuclear energy by reframing the issue in positive terms, as a 
solution to security of supply and climate change.   
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Climate change solution 
 
Negative 
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 Safety and health 
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Environmental 
degradation 
Threat to civil liberties 
Mistrust  
Proliferation 
Waste  
Safety 
Economic cost  
Terrorism  
Proliferation 
Media Pro-nuclear Anti-nuclear Mixed 
Policy venue 
Venue  Private Public Public – and private?  
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Executive Executive and legislature Executive, legislature, 
stakeholders 
Public opinion Pro-nuclear Anti-nuclear Less anti-nuclear 
Image-venue interaction 
Mobilsation 
type 
Downsian mobilisation Schattschneider 
mobilisation 
Schattschneider 
mobilisation? 
Policy 
entrepreneur 
Nuclear industry Environmental pressure 
groups 
Nuclear industry 
Construction of policy 
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Collapse of policy 
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Two reactor-building 
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proposed (both 
downscaled),  
nuclear moratorium. 
Nuclear option kept 
open… 
 
Figure 7: Summary of image-venue interactions underlying the nuclear energy 
debate 
 
6 Beyond Baumgartner and Jones 
The concluding section of this paper provides a critique of Baumgartner and Jones’ 
punctuated equilibrium model as a tool for analysing the development of nuclear energy 
policy in the UK.  As demonstrated above, the framework is found to be useful, however the 
following section explores the weaknesses highlighted by the empirical case study, and raises 
questions about whether the model takes sufficient notice of the role of external events, the 
importance of the international economic and political system, and the role of values and 
social context.   
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6.1 External events 
Baumgartner and Jones appear to reject the notion that national and international events and 
circumstances can provide external “shocks” to the domestic political system (Gourevitch 
1986).  They state that “during periods of positive feedback, the rapid diffusion of new ideas 
often appears due to the actions of one or a few actors or events, when in fact its causes are 
more diffuse” (1993: 242, my emphasis).  While this may be true on some occasions, it is 
perhaps hasty to dismiss the possibility that events can reshape perceptions or redefine issues 
in their own right.  There is little doubt that nuclear accidents, such as Three Mile Island, 
Chernobyl and even smaller radioactive leaks at Sellafield, have had a considerable impact on 
the image of nuclear power (McSorley 2005, Juniper 2005).  As Bull notes, “the fact that 
people still remember the name [of Three Mile Island], even though nobody was killed or 
injured, just brings home to me what a challenge we have because in other industries, 
accidents that kill dozens of people will have been big news of the day, but 30 years on, 
people won’t be able to name the facility that was involved.  And yet we struggle with the 
public legacy of that factor” (2005).  September 11th was another defining moment which 
introduced a new negative dimension to the image of nuclear energy.  
It would therefore seem reasonable to assume that in some circumstances, issue expansion 
and image redefinition may occur in the absence of a policy entrepreneur.  And equally, an 
entrepreneur may sometimes be frustrated by the lack of a defining event to enable issue 
expansion to take place (as was arguably the case for the nuclear industry during the 1990s) 
(Dalquist 2004: 25). 
6.2 International political and economic arenas 
It can also be argued that there is a “growing international dimension to the whole UK energy 
situation” (Bull 2005), which Baumgartner and Jones fail to make sufficient provision for in 
their model.  International institutions and an increasingly global economy can affect the 
choices available domestically and also shape the way national problems are understood.   
First, the importance of international institutions should not be underestimated.  The 
European Union (EU), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
Kyoto Protocol and the G8 all represent institutions that have had an impact on in the UK 
nuclear debate.  The EU, for example, is increasingly a venue where the nuclear and 
environmental lobbies are active.  McSorley (2005) explains that 80 per cent of UK 
environmental legislation comes from the EU, and therefore groups like Greenpeace spend 
time lobbying on issues such as the legality of government subsidies to the nuclear industry.  
James (2005), meanwhile, points out that the NIA work alongside international nuclear 
organisations, such as the European Atomic Forum (FORATOM) and the World Nuclear 
Association.  Furthermore, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol have brought climate change 
and greenhouse gas emissions to the domestic agenda, which has created further agenda-
setting opportunities for domestic strategic actors.  And there is little doubt that the UK 
holding the G8 and EU Presidencies has raised the profile of climate change, especially after 
Blair named it as one of his international policy priorities.        
Second, the international economic and political climate also affects the availability and 
cost of alternative energy sources.  Oil and gas prices in particular impact directly on the 
nuclear energy debate (James 2005, Bull 2005), for example, it is in the context of recent oil 
price hikes that The Sun published an article advocating nuclear power.  Other important 
international factors include: the increased deregulation of domestic energy markets, the EU’s 
carbon Emissions Trading System, the increasing foreign ownership of UK utilities, growing 
nuclear interests in the portfolios of British energy players, and the importance of 
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comparative energy prices in terms of the competitiveness of energy-intensive British 
industry46 (Bull 2005). 
Finally, cross-national policy spillovers may also affect the framing of the domestic debate 
and provide a convenient backdrop for policy entrepreneurs wishing to reframe the terms in 
which an issue is discussed.  For example, Atlee’s desire to begin a British nuclear 
programme in first place was in response to the US denying Britain access to its nuclear 
technology after the Second World War.  Similarly, Thatcher’s preoccupation with the 
nuclear industries in France and the US also doubtless had impact on her enthusiasm for 
nuclear at home.  Further, it has been argued that if Bush’s Energy Bill leads to a reactor 
building programme “it will undoubtedly have an affect on the argument here” (James 2005). 
6.3 Norms, values and social environment 
A social constructivist critique may suggest that the punctuated equilibrium model pays 
insufficient attention to social values, norms and perceptions.  Rochefort and Cobb, who 
agree that issue definition lies at the heart of policy change, observe the role of cultural values 
in explaining how problems are constructed (1994: 4).  Furthermore, Bosso goes on to explain 
that “if problem definition hinges on the social construction of reality, then culture, 
commonly held values, ideology, political socialization, and ideas all matter” (Bosso 1994: 
183).  Clearly, it would be unfair to claim that values and understandings don’t play a role in 
Baumgartner and Jones’ framework because ideas, values and ideologies are said to underlie 
policy systems and images (1993: 7).  However, the authors’ quantitative methods do not 
easily lend themselves to constructivist analysis.  Further, if images are attached to values, but 
values are subject to change over time, then changing values and social context could be an 
interesting variable to explore.  The rise of the environmental movement, for example, has 
been attributed to changing social values.   
6.4 Conclusion 
As Baumgartner and Jones themselves proclaim, “closely examining the validity of a theory 
in one context constitutes only a limited test of it…positive evidence offers only limited 
confirmation” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 60).  This study therefore provides some 
validation of Baumgartner and Jones’ theory, which is found to be useful in analysing agenda-
setting and policy subsystems in the UK with respect to nuclear energy policy.  The model’s 
flexible, broad, integrated, and multi-dimensional approach make it a valuable tool, enabling 
rich empirical accounts to be drawn. 
However, the findings of this study support the criticism made by John that “to explain 
policy change…the authors have to reach outside their model” (1998: 181).  Indeed, this 
paper suggests that the model could be modified to better incorporate socio-economic factors, 
international institutions and external events.  Baumgartner and Jones’ theory does not 
preclude the integration of these variables as such, but the authors could be more explicit in 
factoring them in to their analysis.  For example, the variable “policy venue” could be 
extended to include international venues, and it could be acknowledged that external events 
can have a re-framing effect on an issue.  
Furthermore, it is argued that this study makes a case for taking a more constructivist 
epistemological approach to agenda-setting models, and promoting the use of qualitative 
methods.  The research has demonstrated that a purely qualitative methodology can have 
considerable value, and suggests that the importance of cognitive processes in understanding 
social environments, images, ideas, and perceptions of risk could be better explored if an 
46 For example, comparative domestic energy prices in Britain and France will have a strong impact on 
the relative competitiveness of their energy-intensive industries, such as steel. 
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extensive constructivist approach were taken.  Boholm, for example, suggests “qualitative 
interpretative approaches can add to our understanding of how risk messages are socially and 
culturally construed in modern society” (1998).  A core weakness of a constructivist approach 
would be to attract further criticism from positivist commentators such as John, who propose 
that the punctuated equilibrium model is already too descriptive and lacks a causal 
mechanism (John 1998: 181).   Nevertheless, I would argue that a more constructivist 
perspective would open up potential areas for research and bring new important dimensions to 
agenda-setting models.  For example, the role of meta-paradigms could be explored, and 
cross-cultural case studies could be undertaken.  In terms of the former, it could be argued 
that much of the nuclear debate has taken place within the “meta-paradigm” of economic 
growth.  If the paradigm were to shift, however, towards sustainable consumption, for 
example, (as many environmental groups advocate), this could have an enormous impact on 
the framing of the debate and the way in which images are interpreted (i.e. whether they are 
understood as being positive or negative).  A second possible research path could be to 
undertake a cross-country comparison of nuclear energy and agenda-setting processes using 
Baumgartner and Jones’ model.  International actors, institutions and discourses could be 
incorporated in the analysis, and countries could be chosen due to their supposed similar 
social values or cultural attitudes to nuclear power (e.g. France and the US) or on the basis of 
their differences (e.g. Japan versus Sweden). 
 
CICERO Working Paper 2006:01  
Nuclear Energy: Rise, Fall and Resurrection 
 
 
 
32
References 
Anderson, J. (1975), Public Policy-Making.  New York: Praeger. 
Arthur, W.B. (1990), Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, Scientific American, February: 92-99. 
Arthur, W.B. (1989), Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events, 
Economic Journal 99: 116-31. 
Arthur, W.B. (1988), Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, in P.W. Anderson, K.J. Arrow and 
D. Pines (eds.), The Economy as an Evolving Complex System.  Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. 
Baumgartner, F.R. and B.D. Jones (1993), Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F.R. and B.D. Jones (1991), Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems, Journal of 
Politics 53: 1044-74. 
BBC News (2004a), If…The Lights Go Out, 26th February 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/if/3487048.stm
BBC News (2004b), ‘Nuclear’ Bishop Quits Campaign, 22nd October. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/3944535.stm
BBC Television (2004), If…The Lights Go Out, BBC2, Wednesday, 10 March. 
Boholm, A. (1998), Visual Images and Risk Messages: Commemorating Chernobyl, Risk Decision and 
Policy 3 (2): 125-143.  
Bosso, C.J. (1994), The Contextual Bases of Problem Definition, in D.A. Rochefort and R.W. Cobb 
(eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition.  Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.  
Braxton, D., E. Wunderer, E. Campion, and L.J. Frewer (1999), A Comparison of UK Media Reporting 
of the Chernobyl Accident and BSE, Center for Risk Research,  
Stockholm School of Economics http://www.dynam-it.com/riskpercom/pdf/acou.pdf
Breach, I. (1978), The Windscale Inquiry.  London: New Society.  
Brenwin, T.B. (1994), Chernobyl and the Media, British Medical Journal 309: 208-9. 
Burnham, P., K. Gilland, W. Grant and Z. Layton-Henry (2004), Research Methods in Politics. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Bull, Adrian (2005), Interview, British Nuclear Fuels Limited. London, 11th August. 
Casstevens, T. (1980), Birth and Death Processes of Governmental Bureaus in the United States, 
Behavioural Science 25: 161-65. 
Cobb, R.W. and D. Elder (1983), Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-
Building.  Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Cobb, R.W. and D. Elder (1972), Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-
Building.  Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972. 
Cobb, R.W., J.K. Ross and M.H. Ross (1976), Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process, 
American Political Science Review 70: 126-137. 
Cohen, M., J. March and J. Olsen (1972), A Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice.  
Administrative Science Quarterly 17: 1-25. 
Considine, M. (1998), Making Up the Government’s Mind: Agenda Setting in a Parliamentary System, 
Governance: An International Journal of Public Administration 11 (3): 297-317. 
Cook, F.L. (1981), Crime and the Elderly: The Emergence of a Policy Issue.  In (ed.) D.A. Lewis, 
Reactions to Crime.  Beverley Hills CA: Sage. 
CICERO Working Paper 2006:01  
Nuclear Energy: Rise, Fall and Resurrection 
 
 
 
33
Cook, F.L. and W.G. Skogan (1990), Agenda Setting and the Rise and Fall of Policy Issues: the Case 
of Criminal Victimization of the Aged.  Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 8: 
395-415. 
Dalquist, S. (2004), A Chronology of Public Opinion on Nuclear Power in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, 29th April, MIT. 
Department of Energy (1988), Privatising Electricity, CM 322.  London: HMSO. 
Devine, F. (1995), Qualitative Analysis, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in 
Political Science. London: MacMillan. 
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2005), Current Energy Policy Review and Nuclear Power, 
DTI website: http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/nuclear/technology/history.shtml
DTI (2003), Our Energy Future – Creating a Low Carbon Economy, Energy White Paper: London: 
HMSO. 
DTI (1994), The Nuclear Review.  London: HMSO. 
Downs, A. (1972), Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue Attention Cycle, Public Interest 28: 38-50. 
Economist, The (2005), The Nuclear Answer?  Leader, July 7th. 
Eurobarometer (2002), Energy: Issues, Options and Technology - Science and Society, European 
Commission, December 2002, EUR 20624. 
Flick, U. (2002), An Introduction to Qualitative Research.  London: Sage. 
Gourevitch, P. (1986), Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic 
Crises.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Gowing, M. (1974), Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-45.  London: MacMillan. 
Gowing, M. (1964), Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Nuclear Energy 1945-52.  London: 
MacMillan 
Greenaway, J., S. Smith and J. Street (1992), Deciding Factors in British Politics: A Case-Studies 
Approach. London: Routledge. 
Guardian, The (2005), Capitulation to the Nuclear Lobby is a Politics of Despair, Polly Toynbee, May 
25th. 
Guardian, The (1978), Windscale. London. 
Guba, E. and Y.S Lincoln (1994), Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research, in N.K. Denzin and 
Y.S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research.  Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
Hall, P.A. (1993), Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy-
Making in Britain, Comparative Politics 25 (3): 275-96. 
Hall, T. (1986), Nuclear Politics: The History of Nuclear Power in Britain.  Harmondsworth, England: 
Penguin. 
Heclo, H. (1974), Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance.  
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
HMSO (1978), The Windscale Inquiry (also known as the “Parker Report”).  London: HMSO. 
Howlett, M. (1997), Issue-Attention and Punctuated Equilibria Models Reconsidered: An Empirical 
Examination of the Dynamics of Agenda-Setting in Canada, Canadian Journal of Political Science 
30 (1): 3-29. 
James, Simon (2005), Interview, Nuclear Industry Association. London, 4th August. 
Jameson, A. (2004), Britain Must Go Nuclear, Energy Chief Tells Ministers, The Times, 14th 
September. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1261215,00.html
John, P. (1998), Analysing Public Policy. London: Cassell. 
Jones, C. (1970), An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy.  Belmont, California: Wadsworth 
Publishing.  
CICERO Working Paper 2006:01  
Nuclear Energy: Rise, Fall and Resurrection 
 
 
 
34
Juniper, T. (2005), Interview. London, 4th August. 
Kaufman, H. (1976), Are Government Organizations Immortal?  Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution. 
Kay, J. (2001), Meeting of Closed Minds, The Financial Times, 28th November. 
Kemp, R. (1986), Institutional Adaptation in the UK Nuclear Technology Industry, Public 
Administration 64: 355-46. 
Kingdon, J.W. (1984), Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies.  Boston: Little Brown.   
Kirschel, M. (2005), Interview, Nuclear Industry Association. London, 4th August. 
Knight, R. (2004), The Evolving Landscape of the Energy Debate, BNFL World: 24-6 (April). 
Knight, R. (2003), Sitting on the Fence: The Undecided Control the Balance of Opinion about Nuclear 
Energy in Britain, BNFL World: 46-9 (June).  
Leake, J. and D. Box (2005), The Nuclear Charm Offensive, New Statesman, Cover Story, 23rd May. 
LeCompte, M.D. and J.P. Goetz (1982), Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic 
Research, Review of Educational Research 52: 31-60. 
Lilleker, D.G. (2003), Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield, Politics, 23 
(3): 207-14. 
Lincoln, Y.S. and E. Guba (1985), Naturalistic Inquiry.  Beverly Hills, California: Sage. 
Lindblom, C. (1977), Politics and Markets.  New York: Basic Books. 
Lindblom, C. (1959), The Science of Muddling Through, Public Administration Review 19: 79-88. 
Lowndes, V. (2002), Institutionalism, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in 
Political Science, Second Edition. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Majone, G. (1989), Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process.  New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Massey, A. (1988), Technocrats and Nuclear Politics.  Aldershot: Avebury. 
McCombs, M.E. and D.L. Shaw (1972), The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 36 (2): 176-187. 
McConnell, G. (1966), Private Power and American Democracy.  New York: Knopf. 
McSorley, J. (2005), Telephone Interview, 3rd August. 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) (2005), Purpose, NDA Website: 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/About_the_NDA--Purpose_(9).aspx?pg=9
O’Riordan, T. (1988), The Prodigal Technology, Political Quarterly 59 (2): 161-77. 
Peters, B.G. (1986), American Public Policy: Promise and Performance, Second Edition. Chatham, 
NJ: Chatham House. 
Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) (2002), The Energy Review. London: Cabinet Office. 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/su/energy/TheEnergyReview.PDF
Plein, L.C. (1994), Agenda Setting, Problem Definition, and Policy Studies, Policy Studies Journal 22 
(4): 701-4. 
Riker, W.H. (1980), Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of 
Institutions, American Political Science Review 74: 432-46. 
Rochefort, D.A. and R.W. Cobb (eds.) (1994), The Politics of Problem Definition.  Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas.  
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (1976), Nuclear Power and the Environment, Sixth 
Report. HMSO, September. 
CICERO Working Paper 2006:01  
Nuclear Energy: Rise, Fall and Resurrection 
 
 
 
35
Sabatier, P.A. (1991), Towards Better Theories of the Policy Process, Political Science and Politics 24 
(2): 147-156. 
Sabatier, P.A. (1988), An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-
Oriented Learning Therein, Policy Sciences 21 (Fall): 129-168. 
Saward, M. (1992), The Civil Nuclear Network in Britain, in D. Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy 
Networks in British Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Schattschneider, E.E. (1960), The Semi-Sovereign People.  New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Select Committee of Science and Technology (1973-4), The Choice of a Reactor System, HC 145. 
Select Committee of Science and Technology (1972-3), Nuclear Power Policy, HC 350. 
Select Committee of Science and Technology (1968-9), United Kingdom Nuclear Power Industry, HC 
401. 
Select Committee of Science and Technology (1966-7), United Kingdom Nuclear Power Programme, 
HC 381, XVII. 
Stenzel, T. (2003), What Does it Mean to Keep the Nuclear Option Open in the UK? Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology Report E-13. 
Stone, D. (1989), Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas.  Political Science Quarterly 
104: 281-300. 
Strauss, L.L. (1954), Speech to the National Association of Science Writers, New York City, 
September 16th, New York Times, September 17. 
Sun, The (2005), Time for Blair to Nuke Britain. Ian King, 10th August. 
Thatcher, M. (1993), The Downing Street Years, London: Harper Collins. 
Wakeham, J. (1989), Hansard, c.1178, 9th November. 
Watts, R. and A. Murray-Watson (2005), Beckett ‘is blocking the building of nuclear power stations,’ 
The Sunday Times, 8th May. 
Weart, S. (1988), Nuclear Fear: A History of Images.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Wildavsky, A. (1984), The Politics of the Budgetary Process.  Fourth Edition.  Boston: Little Brown.  
Williams, R. (1980), The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Policies 1953-78.  London: Croom Helm. 
Williamson, J. and A. Weyman (2005), Review of the Public Perception of Risk, and Stakeholder 
Engagement, Health and Safety Laboratory, Harpur Hill, HSL/2005/16.  Buxton, UK: Crown. 
Wynne, B. (1982), Rationality and Ritual: The Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear Decisions in Britain. 
Chalfont St. Giles, UK: British Society for the History of Science. 
Wåhlberg, A.A.F. and L. Sjöberg (2000), Risk Perception and the Media, Journal of Risk Research 3 
(1): 31-50. 
